An Empirical Test of the Asymmetric Models on Innovative Activity: Who Invests More into R&D the Incumbent or the Challenger? by Czarnitzki, Dirk & Kraft, Kornelius
Non-technical Summary
One of the most discussed topics regarding innovation is the question,
whether the current market leader invests more into R&D than a potential
entrant who is not present at the market yet. Game theoretic models by
Gilbert and Newbery (1982), Reinganum (1983, 1984, 1985) and others lead
to opposing results. The so called auction model considers an incumbent
firm which is faced with one or more potential entrants who also compete for
process innovations. In this model, the incumbent offers more for a non-
drastic innovation than a potential entrant. The second line of research are
the so called stochastic patent racing models. Here, the incumbent invests
more into R&D than a potential entrant: With increasing R&D investment the
expected time period until innovation is shortened and therewith the current
profits of the incumbent would disappear.
In this paper, we present the results of an empirical test on this issue. We
use data from the Mannheim Innovation Panel of about 3500 German firms
from 1992 to 1995. The main advantage of this survey is that the firms are
asked about the exact purpose of their innovative activities. Thus, we are
able to distinguish between the motivation to secure the current market
share in contrast to the plan to enter a new market. Additionally, we use sev-
eral control variables like market share, capital intensity, firm size, export
intensity, import penetration and concentration. It turns out that the potential
entrant invests more into R&D than other firms, but in contrast, the incum-
bent has no significant higher R&D intensity. Hence, the models on patent
races by Reinganum and others are supported.
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11.  Introduction1
One of the major discussions on innovation in recent years has been on the
effect of current market power upon a firm’s activity to engage in innovation
projects (Schumpeter, 1934, 1942, Arrow, 1962). Nowadays, game-theoretic
models are applied to investigate this topic. In short, there are two competing
approaches which come to opposing results. This paper reports the results
of an empirical test on this issue.
The effect of monopolistic market power versus the stimulus of an outside
challenger on innovative activity has been analyzed by two competing mod-
els. Firstly, the so-called auction model by Gilbert and Newbery (1982) con-
siders the question who offers more for a process innovation, a monopolist
or a challenging firm. There is full information and no uncertainty on the ef-
fects of this innovation. The monopolist offers more than the challenger if the
innovation is non-drastic and both bid the same amount if it is drastic.
Secondly, patent races (Lee and Wilde, 1980, Reinganum, 1983, 1984, 1985
among others) consider the path to innovation under uncertainty. Firms in-
vest into R&D, but this can only influence the probability of successful inno-
vation without certainty. In such a situation the challengers have an incentive
to invest more than the incumbent and will most likely enter the market. This
leads to a world of creative destruction (Reinganum, 1985), where the cur-
rent leaders are likely to be substituted by entrants.
Until now – and to the best of our knowledge - not a single study exists that
tries to perform an empirical test on the relevance of these theories for real-
ity. This is surprising given the broad discussion about this issue but it is also
not a trivial task since the models have quite restrictive assumptions and are
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2highly stylized. The present paper tries to close this gap and reports results
from an empirical study on this topic. It uses data of the Mannheim Innova-
tion Panel (MIP) on about 3500 firms from 1992 to 1995 in Germany. Our
panel is unbalanced, leading to 5862 observations. The main advantage of
this survey is that firms are questioned about the exact purpose of the inno-
vative activity. It is thus possible to distinguish between the motivation to se-
cure the current market share from the plan to enter a new market. Hence,
we can take into account the intention to enter a new market, and not only
the actually realized entry. This is a major advantage over earlier studies, as
the observed entry may only be due to luck, but not to systematic higher in-
vestment into innovative activity. In the empirical study it turns out that the
potential entrant invests more into R&D than the incumbent.
The results are of considerable interest for both theory and economic policy.
The literature on the role of the market leader versus the challenger in R&D
processes is one of the most important contributions to the theory of innova-
tion. The surveys by Reinganum (1989) and Tirole (1988, ch. 10) impres-
sively demonstrate this. However, there is not a single explicit test on this
issue. This is, however, in part due to the very restrictive set-up of the mod-
els which make a test rather difficult since the described world almost never
exists. Furthermore, the data required for such a test is hardly available. As
Reinganum (1984, p. 62) states: “In order to move into direction of empirical
testing, we must both extend these models in more realistic directions to ac-
commodate existing data, and attempt to gather the specific data required to
test directly such models of firm behavior.” We intend to do this job.
It seems to be obvious that policy institutions need better information on the
impact of competition. Theory might be helpful in this respect, but as the re-
sults are rather controversial, an empirical test seems to be an important
contribution for policy recommendations. Subsidies by government agencies,
as well as private credit from banks or other institutions tend to support es-
tablished firms more than potential entrants to a market. This might be ap-
propriate if the established firm provides a larger impact on technical prog-
3ress than the challenger. A more detailed discussion is needed, however, if
the potential entrant is the one that improves processes and products more
significantly. The following section deals with theoretical considerations.
Section 3 contains a data description and the econometric application.
2.  Theoretical Considerations on Asymmetry in
Market Power
The effect of market power on innovative activity is one of the questions,
perhaps even the first question, that has been raised in the discussion on the
determinants of technical progress. Schumpeter (1934, 1942) starts with an
argumentation in favor of large firms and imperfect competition as supportive
for innovation. Arrow (1962) shows that for both a drastic and a non-drastic
process-innovation an incumbent monopolist has a lower incentive to invent
compared to an inventor who currently has no market share. His result is due
to the fact that the monopolist would sacrifice his current profits, which do not
play a role for an entrant because the entrant has no current profits resulting
from activities on this particular market. However, Arrow (1962) does not
consider the case that the entrant could substitute the incumbent.
Further research on this topic has basically led to two opposing models on
analyzing asymmetric situations. Gilbert and Newbery (1982) use the so-
called auction model to examine this question. They consider the case of an
incumbent firm which faces one or more potential entrants who also compete
for a process-innovation. This model assumes that every firm enters a bid on
the innovation and the maximal bid is regarded as the maximal amount spent
for research and development. The firm with the highest bid will win this
contest.
A sketch of this model is given in appendix A. At present, it is sufficient to
compare the incentives of an incumbent and the challenger. The most im-
portant assumption in this tournament is that the monopolist would be sub-
stituted by the entrant in the case of a drastic innovation and has to share
4the oligopoly profits in the case of a non-drastic innovation. Thus, the mo-
nopolist has to take account of the possibility to be substituted. This is the
major difference to the Arrow (1962) model.
In the case of a drastic innovation both the incumbent and the entrant bid the
same amount. However, for a non-drastic innovation the monopolist has the
incentive to offer more because when it wins the contest, then its position as
a monopolist is secured. The challenger offers at most the amount equiva-
lent to the duopoly profits of the duopolist with the lower costs. In general,
this is less than the monopoly profits minus the duopoly profits of the incum-
bent if the challenger has innovated, which is the relevant comparison to
make (see appendix A). This is due to the so-called efficiency effect which
means the joint profits of the duopolists are equal or less than the profits of
the monopolist.
The incentive for pre-emptive patenting and persistent monopoly arises from
the dissipation of industry profits if the market becomes less concentrated. In
a comment Salant (1984) discusses the possibility of licensing. If this is a
possibility, then the most-efficient firm will win the patent. Afterwards, the
winning firm may sell it to the other firm if this other one is a more effective
producer. Optimal licensing will result in a monopolized market, but the inno-
vator must not necessarily be the incumbent.
The second line of research analyses R&D processes by means of so-called
stochastic racing models. Both the models and the results are in strong con-
trast to the auction model. A deeper analysis is relegated to appendix A, as
our summary of the theory is not original.
The models usually consider the case of process innovation, but can under
some assumptions be extended to product innovations (Reinganum, 1985).
The basic model by Reinganum (1983) shows that when the successful in-
novator captures a sufficiently high market share, then the incumbent firm
invests less in research and development than a potential entrant. The rea-
son for this is uncertainty. The incumbent receives a flow of profits before
5another firm develops a successful innovation. The period until the discovery
and introduction of the innovation is then of random length, but it will be
shorter if all firms invest more into R&D as the probability of success in-
creases. Now, the incumbent has relatively less incentives to shorten this
period than the challenger, as it would substitute itself and the current profits
would disappear. The challenger, by definition, has no current profits and
has different, higher incentives to invest. Thus, the patent races have a clear
connection to the original Arrow (1962) model, although the analysis differs
considerably in detail.
A further problem is the distinction between drastic and non-drastic process
innovations. Reinganum (1983) defines an open neighborhood of cost condi-
tions such that if the technology is not drastic, the challenger still invests
more into R&D than the incumbent.
The two models lead to opposing hypotheses on R&D intensity if a market
leader is compared with a challenger. The main problem is that the models
have a very restrictive structure, which severely limits the relevance and the
possibility for an empirical test. The main emphasis of the models is on proc-
ess innovation for an otherwise absolutely identical product. Product innova-
tion is usually excluded. This procedure has the advantage that the market
structure after innovation is easily described. Drastic versus non-drastic in-
novation is also clearly defined. It has the disadvantage for empirical re-
search that in many cases process and product innovation are not inde-
pendent events, but are related in one or the other way (Kraft, 1990). Fur-
thermore, firms usually do not differ in practice between R&D for process
and product innovation. Thus, an empirical test for R&D intensity limited to
process innovation is hardly possible. Finally, Schumpeter and others had
not only process, but perhaps even more product innovation in mind, when
they discussed “creative destruction”, and the modern theory on the role of
the incumbent versus the challenger should be able to say something about
product innovation as well.
6Reinganum (1985) shortly discusses the extension of the patent races mod-
els for product innovation. If the product innovation captures a “sufficiently
large“ share of the new market, the analysis is similar to a drastic process
innovation. The earlier developed products are of minor importance and
could be disregarded. If, however, the new product is one among several,
product differentiation has to be included and the models would become
much more non-transparent. There would be the necessity to define the bor-
der case between a “sufficiently large“ market share and a smaller one.
Hence, the models on patent racing apply to product innovation as well, if the
new product is a close substitute to existing ones but has a significantly
higher quality, like, for example, a color TV in contrast to black and white TV
or a CD-player versus the conventional record-player (vertical product differ-
entiation without significant price differences). In case of horizontal product
differentiation the situation is much more complex and it is not clear whether
the theories that have just been discussed are useful in such a case.
Dixit (1988), Bagwell and Staiger (1992) as well as, among others, Jensen
and Thursby (1996) consider races between different countries for product
innovation. Bagwell and Staiger (1992, p. 797) assume that "scale econo-
mies are sufficiently important, that the market can only support the entry of
one firm”. Jensen and Thursby (1996) discuss the situation, where firms ei-
ther develop the same product or develop closely related products. Dixit
(1988) analyses the outcome of an R&D process that can apparently lead to
a new process or an identical product, which cannot be imitated because of
a patent. The assumption of an identical product is somewhat extreme, but
that product innovations are close substitutes seems to be reasonable. The
question remains whether close substitutes get independent patents, or if
only the first product receives a patent. Only in the latter case do the models
of patent races apply.
Most product innovations are licensed to other firms. However, this is less
clear for process innovations. It is possible that licensing has an effect on the
incentives to innovate. Salant (1984) has shown that this is the case for the
7auction model. The models on licensing based on the situation of patent
racing show that a drastic (process-) innovation is never licensed, and thus
licensing has no effect on the incentives to innovate (see Reinganum, 1989,
section 4). The articles concerning licensing mainly consider the incentives to
license during the different stages of R&D projects (see for example Gross-
man and Shapiro, 1987), but also on the incentives for R&D investment (see
for example Katz and Shapiro, 1987). An incumbent who is ahead with re-
spect to cost minimization may license its technology in order to protect itself
against the risk of discovery of a lower cost technology by an entrant. How-
ever, it seems that this result is of minor importance for our empirical project.
3.  Empirical Study
The purpose of this section is to report the results of an empirical study on
the R&D investment of the market leader versus the challenger. Firstly, we
discuss the data used and then the econometric models applied.
3. 1.  Data
This study uses data from the Mannheim Innovation Panel (MIP) conducted
by the Centre for European Economic Research (ZEW) on behalf of the
German Federal Ministry for Education and Research (bmb+f). This survey
was launched in 1992 and collects information from about 2000 firms of the
manufacturing sector every year. It represents the German part of the Com-
munity Innovation Survey (CIS) of the European Commission. However, the
response rate to some questions is limited and, overall, data concerning
3568 firms are used. We have information from the years 1992 to 1995
yielding an unbalanced panel of about 5862 observations. This sample can
be divided in three main groups: 2419 observations are due to non-
innovating firms and 765 observations to innovating firms that did not engage
in any R&D activities. The third group are the innovating firms with R&D ac-
tivities (2678 observations). Descriptive statistics of the variables used can
be found in Appendix C.
8The study analyses the activity of firms specified as the expenditures for
R&D divided by sales (multiplied by 100). This is a standard variable and it is
named R&D/SALES. On the one hand, the variable R&D expenditures has
some shortcomings. For example, it is sometimes stated that in particular
small firms do not record these expenditures correctly. However, we have no
indication that this is true for the MIP. On the other hand, R&D is the appro-
priate variable to test for models on patent racing as only the intended but
perhaps not successful innovation process is considered. We are thus in the
position to follow the advice of Reinganum (1984) concerning empirical re-
search on these models, to investigate the program of the unsuccessful firm,
aside of that of the successful companies.
A major advantage of the data used is that the motives for R&D activities are
recorded before the firm in question has succeeded in developing a new
process or product and is actually present in a new market. Hence we are
able to consider potential entry, which possibly never leads to actual entry.
This is an important difference to studies like Geroski (1994, ch. 4 and 5) and
others which analyze the effect of observed and successful entry, but not the
attempts to enter that turned out to be unsuccessful.
The MIP asks the firms in detail for the motives to conduct R&D: “With prod-
uct- and process innovation a number of different aims can be followed. We
would like to know more about the most important motives for the innovation
decision and the innovation strategy of your firm”.2 One question is about the
entry into new markets, more precisely "the enlargement of the products out
of the main markets you are operating in”. The firms can rate this possibility
as being of higher or lower importance on a five scale rating. Our variable
ENTRY has unit value if firms say that this aim has a very high importance,
                                           
2 We only have information on firms which are already existing and produce in one or more
other markets. Otherwise a company cannot participate in the survey. It is possible that firms
enter a market which have just been founded for this purpose and only start production after
successful completion of the R&D process (with or without a new technology). These inno-
vators cannot be considered here.
9i.e. they rate its importance with 5. Otherwise, ENTRY is zero. Only 9% of
our observations on innovative firms answer this question in the affirmative.
Another question is about the importance of securing and increasing the cur-
rent market share. Again, the firms answer on a five scale basis. The dummy
variable INCUMBENT has unit value if the firm in question puts a very high
value, i.e. 5, on this aim. This aim is confirmed by a majority of the firms:
about 65% of all innovators rate this aim with the scaling 5. The market
share has a particular importance in this context. It is measured as
100*
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for all i of each industry on a 3 digit level3. On the one hand, it may have an
independent effect on R&D intensity4. On the other hand, it is of specific im-
portance in the given context as the theoretical models deal with the market
leader, in particular the monopolist. The question whether R&D is used in
order to secure and to increase market share can be answered in the af-
firmative by large as well as by very small firms, as the market share is never
zero. It is not asked whether the company has a large market share. How-
ever, the individual market share perhaps supplies additional information on
firms’ behavior. In order to identify the market leaders, we construct the in-
teraction variable INCUMBENT*SHARE which has its largest value for firms
that have a large market share, and perform R&D in order to secure this
market share.
The main emphasis of this study is on the effect of the variables
INCUMBENT, ENTRY and SHARE on R&D expenditures. However, in order
                                           
3 As industry classification we use the European standard called NACE.
4 One may argue that R&D has an effect on firms' market shares and thus endogeneity
problems occur. However, R&D in period t will possibly induce innovations in period t+s.
These innovations may have an impact on the market share in periods after t+s. Since we
use the contemporary market share to explain R&D activities we do not consider the problem
of possible endogeneity of SHARE.
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to avoid an omitted variable bias as far as possible several control variables
are included. Firm size is specified as the number of employees (EMP). This
variable controls whether innovative activity varies with firm size. This vari-
able takes account of another classical hypothesis by Schumpeter. The
square of this variable (EMP)2 is included as well in order to allow for a non-
linear relationship.
The share of sales exported EXPORT is measured on the individual firm
level and describes the participation to international competition. A related
variable is the share of sales of foreign firms compared to total shares of
both foreign and domestic firms in an industry, which is called IMPORT. This
variable is expected to express the competitive pressure from other countries
and is, of course, of high importance for an open economy like Germany.
Unfortunately, for some industries IMPORT was only available on a two digit
level. IMPORT is generated as imports/(imports+production)*100 measured
in the German currency unit DM.
The next variable is the concentration ratio CONC, which is defined as the
Herfindahl-index on the three digit industry level. It is the sum of squared
market shares of the firms operating in the three digit industry (and then mul-
tiplied by 1000). A major problem here is that in Germany the basic classifi-
cation of industries has changed in the nineties from the SYPRO to the inter-
nationally more convenient NACE standard. The innovation panel classifies
firms according to the NACE standard, but the German statistical office has
published a Herfindahl index only for 1995. We transformed the data from
SYPRO statistics to an index on the basis of the NACE standard for 1991
and 1993 (and calculated averages for the years in between), but this is not
perfectly reliable. Hence, we instrument this variable in order to avoid an er-
ror-in-variable problem. The instruments used are the number of firms, the
inverse of the number of firms, imports and total sales volume of the indus-
try, as well as a deterministic trend. We have also experimented with the ob-
served Herfindahl index from 1995 for the whole period, but the results did
not differ, and thus we present just those which are based on the instru-
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mented values. In addition we use the change of the index from period to
period DCONC. We assume that the consideration of international trade, the
concentration index, the change of this index, and the individual market
share allow to identify the degree of competitive pressure a firm is faced
with.
The panel covers firms which are active in West and East Germany (the for-
mer GDR). In the nineties, East German firms received many tax incentives
and direct subsidies from the government in order to support their develop-
ment, so that it is possible that East German firms behave different from
Western German ones. Hence, we include a dummy variable EAST which
has unit value for companies operating in the East German so-called new
Bundesländer (federal states).
It is possible that the younger firms are also the more innovative ones, as the
foundation of a firm usually goes hand in hand with the introduction of one or
more innovations. The established firms are often reluctant to introduce
“fundamental” innovations and these are launched by newly founded com-
panies. The new firms are possibly also those which go into new markets. In
order to take account of the effect of the age of a firm, we include the inverse
of the age of a firm in question (1/AGE). We use the inverse in order to take
account of a probable non-linear relationship between age and innovative
activities. The variable capital intensity (KAPIN) is defined as tangible fixed
assets per employee in millions DM and is included in order to control for
differing technologies as well as for barriers to entry.
It is well known that the technical opportunities differ considerably between
industries. We include 13 two-digit industry dummies in order to control for
specific effects. The industry "food products and beverages" is the basis for
the comparison. Furthermore, three time dummies indicate whether a obser-
vation is from 1993, 1994 or 1995. The year 1992 is the basis in this case.
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3. 2.  Econometric Methodology and Results
The survey is a sample of firms operating in the German manufacturing
sector. As not all participating firms are innovative or conduct R&D activities,
we have to take account of this problem of censored data. Firstly, we apply
the standard tobit model only to the group of innovative firms because the
objectives of innovations and the R&D activities are only observed for inno-
vative firms. This yields 3443 observations where about 22% are zero, i.e.
with innovative activities but no R&D.
In microeconomic data like ours heteroscedasticity is a common problem.
This is a serious problem when the tobit estimation technique is applied as
not only the estimated standard errors but also the coefficients would be in-
consistent. Therefore, we also estimate a tobit model which accounts for
heteroscedasticity. The technical details are relegated to appendix B. The
firms in question have two decision possibilities: a) innovate or not and b) if it
is decided in favor of innovative activity whether to perform R&D or not (in
the latter case the firm buys external knowledge). This complicated structure
of the econometric estimation is taken into account by the use of a tobit
model with selectivity. The details are also discussed in appendix B.
For our specific question many observations on firms contain missing values
or the firms did not respond every year. Especially, this is true to the innova-
tion strategies. Hence, we do not estimate a panel model for tobit as we
have not sufficient observations on firms over the four years. Many firms
(more than 60%) are only observed once in our dataset. A panel model for
the tobit case has been developed by Honoré (1992) in the first place for the
special situation of two observations (years) per firm, but it can be extended
to t>2 as well. However, we have very few observations per firm (and in
many cases just one) and hence the “within” variation will necessarily be very
limited. We use a specific tobit-model, which accounts for sample selection
in an innovative way and it remains to be shown how this model is adapted
to panel applications. Here we pool the data. Although the covariance matrix
could be misspecified in that case this should not have a considerable effect
13
on the estimated standard errors because the relative importance of re-
peated observations on same firms is marginal (see the pattern of the panel
structure in appendix C).
Thirteen industry dummies were added in order to take account of differ-
ences in technological opportunities and reduce problems with individual ef-
fects as far as possible. These dummy-variables are usually highly signifi-
cant.
The results of the standard tobit and the tobit with correction for heterosce-
dasticity are displayed in table 1. It turns out that the incumbent never has a
significantly larger share of R&D expenditures in relation to sales. In contrast
the challenger has significantly higher R&D expenditures. The results are
very stable and do not depend on the choice between the normal tobit and
that with consideration of heteroscedasticity. The tobit with endogenous cor-
rection for heteroscedasticity shows in addition the significant negative im-
pact of the interaction variable INCUMBENT*SHARE. This is strong evi-
dence in favor of the patent-race model.
We carry out two different kinds of heteroscedasticity tests. On one hand, we
compute a Lagrange multiplier test (LM) based on the restricted homosce-
dastic model. Its advantage is that one needs neither to model the hetero-
scedasticity as a particular function nor to estimate any heteroscedastic
model. See Greene (1997, p. 969) for the computation of the test statistics. If
all regressors (except EMP2) are suspected to cause heteroscedasticity, the
Lagrange multiplier value for Model I [Model II] is LM = 2465.23 [2467.56].
Since this is asymptotically distributed χ2 with 27 [28] degrees of freedom we
can clearly reject the hypothesis of homoscedasticity. We also tested the
regressors one by one but this lead to the same results, i.e. all regressors
are considered to cause heteroscedasticity. On the other hand, we use a
likelihood ratio statistic to test the hypothesis that all coefficients of the het-
eroscedasticity term are zero. Therefore, we have to compare the log likeli-
hood values of both the restricted homoscedastic model and the unrestricted
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heteroscedastic one. The statistic is LR = 1793.36 [1799.54]. The hypothesis
of homoscedasticity, i.e. all coefficients of the heteroscedasticity term being
zero is, again, clearly rejected.
Table 1: Determinants of R&D/Sales – Tobit Estimates
Model I Model II
Variable Tobit Tobit with
Heteroscedasticity
Tobit Tobit with
Heteroscedasticity
Constant -5.73
(-5.80)
-2.90
(-3.60)
-5.70
(-5.77)
-2.95
(-3.68)
EMP/100 .02
(2.90)
.01
(2.33)
.02
(1.88)
.01
(3.26)
(EMP)2/100 -1.64*10
-5
(-1.98)
-7.21*10-6
(-1.83)
-1.59*10-5
(-1.92)
-7.35*10-6
(-2.69)
EXPORT .03
(4.78)
.02
(5.83)
.03
(4.80)
.02
(5.87)
IMPORT .09
(3.26)
.03
(2.20)
.09
(3.28)
.03
(2.30)
KAPIN 1.24
(.94)
1.36
(1.11)
1.22
(.93)
1.36
(1.14)
INCUMBENT*
SHARE
--- --- .04
(.76)
-.04
(-2.52)
SHARE -.01
(-.33)
-.03
(-1.70)
-.03
(-.64)
-.02
(-1.51)
INCUMB -.31
(-1.02)
-.02
(-0.15)
-.36
(-1.14)
.04
(0.25)
ENTRANT 1.33
(2.67)
.79
(2.51)
1.33
(2.66)
.81
(2.59)
CONC .009
(1.39)
-.002
(-.45)
.009
(1.40)
-.002
(.71)
DCONC .04
(1.17)
.03
(2.29)
.03
(1.15)
.04
(2.33)
EAST 2.46
(5.79)
.84
(2.87)
2.47
(5.80)
.78
(2.70)
1/AGE .24
(1.15)
-.79
(-1.28)
.23
(.20)
-.73
(-1.18)
Log-Likelihood -9971.18 -9074.50 -9970.90 -9071.13
Notes: All estimations include 13 industry dummies and three year dummies. The heterosce-
dasticity term as given in equation (B.3) of the Tobit with heteroscedasticity includes all ex-
planatory variables except (EMP)2. These results are not reported. The t-values are given in
parentheses. The numbers of observations are n=3443 for each equation.
Additionally, we compare the two heteroscedastic models, i.e. we test if
INCUMBENT*SHARE has significant explanatory power. Again, we use a
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likelihood ratio statistic to test whether the coefficients of this variable are
zero. This statistic is distributed χ2 with 2 degrees of freedom because
INCUMBENT*SHARE is included in the model’s equation, as well as in the
heteroscedasticity term. This yields a critical value of 5.99 on a 5% signifi-
cance level. Our test statistic is LR = 6.74. Thus, INCUMBENT*SHARE has
significant explanatory power and the model including this variable is the
relevant one.
The results in table 1 were obtained using innovative firms only. However,
these results can be biased when the decision of untertaking general inno-
vative activities and engaging in R&D are correlated. Therefore, we have to
take account of this sample selection. Thus, we derive a regression model
with double sample selection. In the first place, a firm has to decide in gen-
eral on the question to innovate or not. If it wants to innovate, it can choose
among several possibilities, e.g. buying new machines, buying licenses, in-
troduce new services related to its products or, in our case, undertake R&D
investment. Hence, we have to add the group of non-innovating firms to our
former sample and apply a regression model with a double selection mecha-
nism. Maddala (1983, sec. 9.6) discusses several models with multiple crite-
ria for self selectivity (see the citations there). Additionally, e.g. Ham (1982)
and Tunali (1986) consider multiple selection criteria in regression. Espe-
cially Tunali (1986) deals with the same selection problem as our model.
However, both Tunali and Ham just expand Heckman's two-step approach to
incorporate the second selection mechanism. As an alternative we use a full
information maximum likelihood (FIML) estimation as this method is efficient.
The likelihood function derived by us is given in Appendix B. For the first se-
lection decision of being innovative we use the binary choice variable,
whether the firm is an innovator or not. The second selection criterion of un-
dertaking R&D is incorporated via the tobit model. Then, our likelihood func-
tion combines a tobit model and a binary choice "probit" model.
For identification we exclude 1/AGE in the tobit model since this was not sig-
nificant in the first estimation (see table 1). However, the model has still con-
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siderable convergence problems with such a structure. Thus, for the probit
equation we transform EXPORT to an export dummy and exclude SHARE
and EMP2 to reduce collinearity among regressors and ease identification.
The results are shown in table 2. Again, all regressors of the tobit model are
included in the heteroscedasticity term as given in equation (B.3).
As the coefficient of correlation between equations ρ is virtually zero the re-
sults are rather similar to those reported in table 1, and thus they seem to be
quite robust. Again, these results are clearly in favor of the patent race model
in contrast to the auction approach. As the auction model is based on cer-
tainty, while the racing approach explicitly includes time and uncertainty, the
latter seems to be better suited for analyzing the innovation process. The
empirical test supports this by the effect of ENTRANT and INCUMBENT.
Further support comes from the significantly negative impact of the interac-
tion variable INCUMBENT*SHARE5. As the theoretical models consider the
incentive of a monopolist, this result is also of high importance for the test of
the theory. The more innovative firms are the outsiders and not the current
market leaders. The results for ENTRANT and INCUMBENT*SHARE may
also contribute to the current discussion on the disproportionate share of
major innovations introduced by small firms (Pavitt et. al., 1987, Acs and Au-
dretsch, 1988, 1990).
                                           
5 The use of an interaction variable possibly explains the difference to the finding of a positive
significant market share by Blundell/Griffiths/van Reenen (1999). Another reason for this
contradiction might be that we use R&D intensity while Blundell et al. use the number of inno-
vations.
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Table 2: Determinants of R&D/Sales – Tobit with Sample Selection
Variable Selection Equation Tobit Equation
Constant -.52
(-4.00)
-2.93
(-3.28)
EMP/100 .006
(1.46)
.01
(3.01)
(EMP)2/100 --- -7.68*10
-6
(-2.54)
EXPORT DUMMY 0.38
(6.64)
---
EXPORT --- .02
(4.83)
IMPORT -.02
(-3.19)
.03
(2.07)
KAPIN .16
(.87)
1.77
(1.36)
INCUMBENT*SHARE --- -.04
(-2.37)
SHARE --- -.02
(-1.65)
INCUMBENT --- -.01
(-.04)
ENTRANT --- .87
(2.63)
CONC .001
(0.64)
-.002
(-.61)
DCONC .001
(0.09)
.04
(2.39)
EAST .10
(1.47)
.78
(2.41)
1/AGE .84
(4.74)
---
λ§ -.06 (-.59)
Log-Likelihood -10663.83
Notes: The estimation includes industry and year dummies. The heteroscedasticity term as
given in equation (B.3) of the tobit with heteroscedasticity includes all explanatory variables
except (EMP)2. The results are not reported. The t-values are given in parentheses. The
numbers of observations are n=5862 for every equation.
§ λ is a transformation of the coefficient of correlation ρ = 2/π * arctan(λ). We impose this
transformation to restrict the parameter ρ to the interval [-1;1]. Hence, ρ = -.04 which is not
different from zero.
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The other results are of interest as well. The control variables work quite
well. A strong effect comes from the share of sales exported6. The import
ratio also has a strong positive impact on innovative activity. Apparently,
these firms are forced to be innovative in order to be successful in interna-
tional competition. These results are in accordance with those for the leader
and the entrant as in both cases more intensive competition increases inno-
vative activity. In contrast, DCONC is sometimes significant and positive,
which points to another conclusion. While the absolute level of concentration
has no impact, the change in concentration has apparently a positive effect.
The time dummies 1993 and 1995 (which are not reported) are significant.
Additionally, we find strong differences between the individual industries,
which does not come as a surprise. Firm size has also an effect. Expendi-
tures for R&D divided by sales increase with firm size, but with a diminishing
rate. The maximal intensity is reached at a firm size of about 44000 employ-
ees. Four firms in our sample are larger, but for the majority we conclude
that the bigger firms are the more research intensive ones. The concentra-
tion ratio is insignificant. The results concerning firm size and concentration
and the other variables describing the competitive situation are somewhat
different than in earlier research on German firms (Kraft 1989) and do only
partly, if at all, support the theory of Schumpeter (1934, 1942). The impact
executed by the potential entrants points to a creative destruction in the view
of Reinganum (1985) on industry evolution and is perhaps in accordance
with the general view of Schumpeter about technical progress. However, the
creative destruction is driven by the challengers and competitive pressure
supports innovative activity, which is not in the spirit of Schumpeter.
                                           
6 One might question the assumed exogeneity of exports as internationally successful firms
are possibly those with a high innovative potential. However, we have not tried to instrument
the export variable, as we have no good instruments available and the methodology is al-
ready quite demanding.
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3. Conclusion
The purpose of the presented study is to perform the first empirical study on
the R&D activities of incumbent versus challenger firms. It is intended to
carry out an empirical test on the conflicting hypotheses of the auction and
the patent racing models.
The data used are 5862 observations from the Mannheim Innovation Panel
(MIP) covering the years 1992 to 1995. The participating firms are, among
other things, asked about the motives for innovative activities. With these
variables it is possible to receive information on intended, but perhaps un-
successful, entry into a new market. Thus, information concerning the un-
successful firms can be used for an empirical test. This is important, as the
successful introduction of an innovative process or product might be the re-
sult of a strategic decision to invest more than the competitors or the out-
come of pure luck. Usually the researcher observes only the fact but not the
reason for innovation. Given the large impact of risk and uncertainty in this
connection, our data seem to be of considerable interest for an analysis of
this question.
It turns out that the challenger invests more into R&D than other firms, but in
contrast, the incumbent has no significantly higher R&D intensity. Thus, the
predictions of the patent racing model are supported. Given the conflicting
hypotheses and the somewhat restrictive assumptions of the two models, the
results of the empirical test were by no means clear ahead of the estimation,
and we regard the outcome of this first attempt as quite supportive for a
combination of theory and empirical research.
The auction model may still have its relevance for innovation projects that
are not as risky as R&D activities. If licenses are bought or a new technology
(from outside) is introduced, the involved risk is presumably much smaller
than that of an R&D process. It remains to be tested whether the Gilbert and
Newbery (1982) model applies to such investments into innovation.
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Of course, the question arises whether these results have any policy conclu-
sions. At present, one has to be careful as this is the first empirical test on
this issue but apparently the potential entrants into new markets play an im-
portant role for technical progress, especially if considerable uncertainty is
involved. Traditionally, government subsidies go to a large extent to the es-
tablished and large firms in industries. Perhaps this is counterproductive
since these firms have a smaller incentive to create new processes and
products, and thus the industrial structure is stabilized and creative destruc-
tion is hindered. Presumably, banks also tend to support the established
firms in refining existing processes and products as this is less risky and de-
mands less specific technical knowledge on the new technology and on new
goods. However, an “industrial revolution” comes from the outsiders, who are
most likely to have some problems with the access to financial sources.
The next step for empirical research on this issue is whether the larger R&D
intensity really leads to more innovations. This is recorded by the MIP as
well. Furthermore, it can be determined, how large the cost reduction due to
process innovation is and how large the market share resulting from product
innovation is. This research will presumably also be important in order to give
clearer guidance for policy recommendations.
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Appendix A
On the Auction and the Patent Racing Models
The auction model considers the situation, where either a monopolist or an
entrant can introduce a process innovation. The process innovation can be
drastic or non-drastic. The innovation leads to a cost reduction from c to c‘,
with c>c‘. The profits associated if the incumbent has introduced the innova-
tion are )'(cIπ . If not the incumbent, but the entrant has introduced the inno-
vation, the profits of the incumbent are )',( ccdπ , which will be zero in the
case of a drastic innovation and positive for a non-drastic innovation. If the
entrant has introduced the innovation her or his profits are ),'( ccdπ . The
value of the innovation for ∞=T and a discount rate r for the entrant is:
(A1)
∞
−
==
0
),'(),'(
r
ccdteccV
d
rtdc ππ .
The respective value for the incumbent is:
(A2)
r
cccV
dI
I )',()'( ππ −
= ,
with the possibility of 0)',( =ccdπ  included. The so-called efficiency assump-
tion states that two duopolists will realize less or equal profits than one mo-
nopolist:
),'()',()'( ccccc ddI πππ +≥ .
In the case of a drastic innovation 0)',( =ccdπ  and the incentive to introduce
or to bid for the innovation is the same for the incumbent and the entrant.
However, in the case of a non-drastic innovation:
(A3) c
ddddI
I V
r
cccccc
r
cccV =−+≥−= )',(),'()',()',()'( πππππ
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and, thus, the incumbent offers more for the innovation, if the inequality sign
applies. In the Gilbert and Newbery model, there is no uncertainty concern-
ing the effects of the innovation. However, if there is uncertainty about the
cost reducing effect of the innovation, and therefore about the question dras-
tic versus non-drastic innovation, the incumbent should bid more than the
challenger.
In the case of patent racing following Dasgupta and Stiglitz (1980) or Lee
and Wilde (1980) and in particular Reinganum (1983, 1985, 1989), the fol-
lowing assumptions are made: The expenditures for research and develop-
ment x influence the probability to invent as the first, to receive a patent on
the innovation and, thus, to terminate the race as the first. A hazard rate is
considered, in which the probability of success by a firm i at a given time t is
an exponential function. In order to derive this function recall that the defini-
tion of a hazard rate (named g in his case) is the probability that a firm will
innovate in the next moment of time P’(t) given that it has not yet done so by
time t 1-P(t):
)(1
)(')(
tP
tPtg
−
= ,
with P’(t) being the derivative of the distribution function. This represents a
differential equation, with the solution −=
−
t
dvvg
etP 0
)(
1)( . The literature usually
assumes 
∞
=
0
)()( txhdvvg .
That is if it  represents firm i’s (random) success date, then
txh
i
iiett )(1)Pr( −−=< , where ih  is the hazard rate or conditional probability
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density of success, given no success at present7. The hazard rate )( ixh  de-
pends on investment into R&D. It is usually assumed that the hazard function
is twice continuously differentiable, with 0)(' >xh  and 0)('' <xh . The choice
variable of the firm in question is the flow expenditure x for R&D so that
txh
i
itiett )(1)Pr( −−=< .
For the exponential distribution the expected date of invention is simply
)(1 jxh  with j=1,...,n denoting the firms (integrate 
∞
−
0
))(( dte txh j ). The ex-
pected success date for firm i is )(/1 ixh . Let ≠= ij jC xhh )(  be the aggre-
gate rival hazard rate (with just one possible entrant this simplifies to
)( jC xhh = ).
The incumbent has to take into account the present profits R, as well as the
probability that she/he or one of the challengers succeeds in innovating. One
can define the derivative txhi iexhtP
)(' )()( −=  as the probability that firm i inno-
vates at time t. A similar probability can be calculated for the other firm.
These probabilities are multiplied by the respective profit levels relevant in
these situations. The expected profit of the incumbent as a function of its
own investment rate and its rival’s hazard rate is:
(A4)
)()(
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0
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I
C
I
I
I
I
C
I
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7 From the MacLaurin expansion of the exponential function follows
)(11...))(()!3())(()!2()(111 3121)( iiii
xh xhxhxhxhe i +−<−−−−−+−=− −−−  but the
difference becomes negligible for small )( ixh  and then )(1
)(
i
xh xhe i ≈− − .
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Considering a simple situation with the incumbent (present monopolist) and
just one challenger (potential entrant), the challenger calculates in a similar
way:
(A5)
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The term ))()(( CI xhxhe +−  determines the probability density of innovation time. If
neither firm has made a discovery, the incumbent’s cash flow is (R-xI). The
cash flow of the challenger in this case is –xC. The difference between both
payoffs are the flow profits of the incumbent, which she/he receives as long
as nobody has succeeded. Secondly, the incumbent receives a (possibly
positive) payoff )',( ccIπ  if the challenger wins.
The probability density that the incumbent discovers first at time t is
))()(()( CI xhxhI exh
+− , and a related probability density can be calculated for the
challenger. If the incumbent discovers an innovation first, its pay-offs are the
present discounted value from time t of monopoly profit using the new tech-
nology rce Irt /)'(π− . In the case of the challenger, drastic and non-drastic
innovations have to be distinguished. If the innovation is non-drastic, both
firms produce positive output after the innovation. Then the firms’ pay-offs
are the present discounted value of the Cournot oligopoly profits:
rcce Irt /)',(π−  and rcce Crt /),'(π− . If the innovation is drastic, the challenger’s
pay-off is the present discounted value of monopoly profits using the new
technology, while the incumbent's pay-off is zero. (The double discounting is
necessary as the investment expenditures arise today as well as in every
period until discovery, while the expected returns from the investment are
due (if at all) after the invention has actually taken place.)
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Differentiation of (A4) leads to:
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This equation can be simplified to:
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The effect of R on xI is obtained by implicit differentiation and turns out to be
for a drastic innovation
[ ]
[ ] 0/
/
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The derivative of the first order condition with respect to R is negative, as the
reader will easily verify. The second order condition requires that the de-
nominator of the equation above is negative. Reinganum (1983) as a corol-
lary states that if R>0, there exists an open neighborhood of cost conditions c
such that if the technology is not drastic, CI xx <  follows.
The term VI includes the possibility of (A3) and thus reflects the so-called
efficiency effect of the Gilbert and Newbery (1982) model. The first term of
(A7) stands for the replacement effect. h’(xI) is higher, xI lower and h(xI)
smaller because of the replacement effect, which dominates the efficiency
effect in this model.
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The direct relation to the auction model of Gilbert and Newbery (1982) is not
easily established. One has to work with examples rather than with a general
theory. First, consider the situation, where it is almost certain that a non-
drastic innovation will be invented during the next period but it is unclear
whether the incumbent or the challenger succeeds. With probability ( )Ixh
the incumbent wins and with probability ( ) ( )IC xhxh −≈ 1  the challenger wins
this race. The value function for the incumbent is in this case:
(A8) ( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( ) I
I
I
I
II xR
r
ccxh
r
cxhV −+−+= ',1' ππ .
Differentiation with respect to R&D expenditures and rearranging yields:
(A9) ( ) ( ) ( )','
1'
ccc
xh III ππ −
= .
A similar procedure for the challenger (who can only enter in the case of
success) implies:
(A10) ( ) ( )ccxh CC ,'
1'
π
= .
In the case of a non-drastic innovation with the efficiency assumption
),'()',()'( ccccc ddI πππ +≥  and because of 0)(' >xh  and 0)('' <xh  the in-
cumbent invests more. In the case of a drastic innovation both players have
the same incentives for R&D investment and thus the results of the Gilbert
and Newbery (1982) model are repeated.
Secondly, consider the case of large efficiency advantages in innovation of
the incumbent, say due to government subsidies to the R&D process. It is
assumed as very probable that an innovation will take place in the near fu-
ture and hence ∞→)( Ixh . Because of the large advantage of the incumbent,
the challenger does not invest into R&D and therefore 0)( =Cxh . Due to the
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subsidies, the incumbent is not automatically granted a patent on the inno-
vation, but has to bid for it in a contest with the challenger. In this case IV
reduces to:
(A11)
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which is identical to (A2) and because of (A3) the incumbent bids more for
the patent.
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Appendix B
The tobit model with heteroscedasticity
The tobit model is used to account for the qualitative difference between limit
observations (zero) and non-censored (continuous) observations. The tobit
model can be expressed as (for more details see e.g. Greene 1997 or Mad-
dala 1983)
(B.1)
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yi*  is the latent variable, i.e. the propensity of undertaking R&D. However, yi
is the observed random variable transformed from yi*. β is the vector of pa-
rameters, xi is the set of regressors and εi denotes the error term.
If ),(~ 2* σµNyi  the log-likelihood for the homoscedastic model is given as
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Φ denotes the standard normal cdf. For the heteroscedastic model one has
to replace σ2 with
(B.3) .'22 iwi e
ασσ =
Greene (1997, p. 968) reports that “this is a fairly general model that includes
many familiar ones as special cases”. α denotes the vector of parameters
and wi the vector of regressors in the heteroscedasticity term.
29
The tobit model with sample selection
Our regression model is given as8
(B.4)
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where the first equation concerns the selection whether the firm is an inno-
vator or not. We observe 11 =y  if 0
*
1 >y  and 01 =y  otherwise. The second
equation is the, say, tobit equation, with *22 yy =  if 00
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Thus, we can construct a likelihood function that consists of three parts tak-
ing account of the three different firm types:
1. Non-innovating firms: Let (.)1Φ  denote univariate standard normal cdf,
then
( ) ( )1111 10 bxyP Φ−== .
2. Innovating firms without R&D activities: Let (.)2Φ  denote bivariate stan-
dard normal cdf and ρ the coefficient of correlation, then

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

−
−Φ==∧= ρ
σ
ββ ,,)10(
2
22
11212
xxyyP
3. Innovating firms with R&D expenditures: To calculate ( )11*22 =∧= yyyP
we have to apply a theorem on incidentally truncated distributions (see
Greene 1997, p. 974-5). The truncated joint density is
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To obtain the incidentally truncated marginal density for y2, we have to
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integrate y1 out of the expression. For our model, this yields
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The moments E(.) and Var(.) are
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Finally, the model's likelihood function is
(B.5)
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For our estimation we allow for heteroscedasticity in the tobit equation.
Therefore, we replace σ2 with σ2i as in equation (B.3). We assume that the
correlation among equations is constant. As a further step one could allow ρ
to vary across observations. However, we restrict ρ being constant because
the maximization of this likelihood function is already quite difficult.
                                                                                                                           
8 For convenience, we drop the index i indicating the i-th observation.
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Appendix C
Descriptive Statistics
Non-Innovating firms
(2419 obs.)
Innovating firms
(3443 obs.)
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
R&D/SALES 0 0 3.64 7.38
EMP/100 1.81 6.11 9.61 48.45
EXPORT 10.30 18.18 23.10 23.28
SHARE .27 1.56 1.10 5.37
KAPIN .09 .15 .09 .12
INCUMBENT -- -- .65 .48
ENTRANT -- -- .09 .29
EAST .34 .47 .30 .46
IMPORT 19.41 10.13 20.17 8.74
CONC 43.07 31.14 48.27 34.78
DCONC .41 5.03 .45 5.08
1/AGE .15 .15 .16 .17
Panel structure
Observed Patterns
1992 1993 1994 1995 Firms Percent Cum.
X 1243 34.84 34.84
X 385 10.79 45.63
X 284 7.96 53.59
X 283 7.93 61.52
X X 248 6.95 68.47
X X X X 246 6.89 75.36
X X X 158 4.43 79.79
X X 128 3.59 83.38
X X X 125 3.50 86.88
Other Patterns 468 13.12 100.00
3568 100.00
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